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ABSTRACT
This article examines how the international competition to attract and retain foreign
direct investment shapes the governance of business and employment systems. Through
an examination of global production networks and the changing role of the state in
economic governance, it highlights the sub-national regional space as an important
level of institutional adaptation. Specifically, it explores how regions organise
themselves to compete for inward investment, and the potential role of industrial
relations actors within this. It argues that both research into multinational companies,
and of the governance of employment systems more generally, need to incorporate an
analysis of regional competition for productive investmentmore fully into their analysis.
1 INTRODUCTION
Work and employment relations across the world are conditioned by the increasing
ability of firms to choose where to locate. Indeed, the long-standing ‘crisis of indus-
trial relations’ in much of the Global North is intimately linked to this face of global-
isation (Thelen and Kume, 1999; Baccaro and Howell, 2011). Some faces of the
challenges posed by internationally mobile firms are well known to labour-oriented
researchers. For example, the phrase ‘social dumping’ is an established part of
European-level discourse on industrial relations (Cooke and Noble, 1998, Hyman,
1999), given the well-known predilection of ‘regime shopping’ firms for locations with
low labour costs, lax regulation and weak trade union organisation (Streeck, 1991;
Logan, 2002). The more general challenges that the mobility, and foreign ownership,
of productive capital causes for national collective bargaining systems have also been
extensively researched (Bélanger and Edwards, 2006; Marginson, 2016), within a
substantial literature on the coordination of industrial relations by multinational
companies (MNCs) (for a review see Collings, 2008).
This article attempts to complement these literatures by developing an analysis of
the struggle between locations to attract and retain jobs within global networks of
the production and exploitation of value, and how this shapes the governance of busi-
ness and employment systems. These struggles involve state and other governance ac-
tors at a wide range of geographical levels. Here, we focus on sub-national, regional
levels of governance, as these often constitute arenas within which social actors of
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various kinds—governmental actors, the managers of firms, trade unionists and a
variety of civil society actors—try to ‘tailor’ (Phelps and Fuller, 2001; MacKinnon,
2012) labour markets and business systems to attract productive capital. Our aim is
to identify forms of agency of social, political and economic actors at regional levels
of governance, as they attempt to attract and retain investment from MNCs. In doing
so, we hope to contribute to the comparative political economy of industrial and
employment relations in general, and work on MNCs in particular, by deepening its
analysis of sub-national geographical levels of governance. In order to do this,
although the current article should be read as a conceptual rather than empirical
contribution, we will make some reference to the empirical findings of our cross-national
comparative project examining MNC-region state relations in Canada, Ireland, Spain
and the UK, which forms the basis of the subsequent empirical articles in this issue.
The article proceeds as follows. The first main section briefly locates the interna-
tional competition for the location of production within the broader regulation of
contemporary capitalism. The second section introduces the ways in which the orga-
nisation of firms, and in particular MNCs, in global production networks (GPN)
has altered their relations with host economies. The third section analyses the role
of sub-national regional governance actors in attempting to shape their labour mar-
ket and broader business systems in response to these pressures, before exploring in-
ternational similarities and differences in how this space is constructed, with regard
to the specific challenges of foreign direct investment (FDI). We argue that this
space, in different places, can involve, to different extents, the deployment of mar-
ket, state or associational governance, but that each of these forms of governance
operates in dynamic tension with the others. The concluding discussion explains
the particular impact of integrating regional governance within an industrial
relations analysis of MNCs, before attempting to draw out wider implications of
our work.
2 THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION FOR THE
LOCATION OF PRODUCTION
MNCs have an increasingly wide choice of locations in which to situate their produc-
tive activities. The context of the competition for investment between locations that
this causes can be analysed either from a variety of levels—the productive dynamics
of the firm, the overall dynamics of contemporary capitalism and/or the role of the
state and transnational institutions in constituting and reproducing patterns of com-
petition between geographies.
At one level, specific factors causing increased international competition for pro-
duction can readily be identified. Thus, researchers have highlighted: the fuller enrol-
ment of China, India and other parts of the Global South, into global circuits of
capital (Gereffi and Sturgeon, 2004); the establishment of continental markets
governed by supranational legislation, particularly the EU and NAFTA, alongside
a broader process of liberalisation of the regulation of global trade (Duina, 2006);
the financialisation of the firm, and the related ideology of the lean enterprise, making
decision-makers in firms increasingly unwilling or unable to tolerate redundancy of
capacity, or to maintain an organisational presence in parts of its value network
where returns on investment are deemed insufficient (Rutherford, 2004; Morgan,
2014); and the multiple ways in which technology, often allied to product market
liberalisation, has enabled markets, both for physical products and services, to be
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serviced remotely, and enabled much closer and more accurate surveillance of the in-
ternational operations of firms (Yamin and Sinkovics, 2007).
All these factors are related to a broad transition at state level from protecting
national productive capitalisms to securing positions in international contests for
mobile investment. Geographies—cities, sub-national regions, nations, and to an
extent supranational trade blocs—engage in competition to attract private-sector
investment. More broadly, the policy decisions of states, at all these geographical
levels, are inflected by efforts to develop or maintain international or global ‘com-
petitiveness’ (Pedersen, 2010). In other words, the contemporary international orga-
nisation of production and the nature of state regulation are intricately intertwined:
the state, at regional, national and supranational levels, has been and remains a
constitutive actor in enabling and reproducing patterns of international competi-
tion, through active processes of re-regulation, both of product markets and of
factors of production, including labour. Theorists of the state’s relationship to inter-
national regimes of capitalism have variously conceptualised this as ‘the competi-
tion state’ (Cerny, 1997), ‘the Schumpeterian workfare state’ or related visions of
a post-Fordist state (Jessop, 2013), or analysed the material and ideological pro-
cesses of the construction of neo-liberalism as an organising principle for globalising
capitalism (Harvey, 2007).
The effects of these developments on the possibilities available for domestic busi-
ness and employment system regulation and coordination have of course been widely
debated. Within the field of industrial relations, the implicit debate on these possibil-
ities has often gone hand-in-hand with a debate on international convergence/diver-
gence of national systems (Hyman, 1999; Colvin and Darbishire, 2013). On the one
hand, IR scholars tend, rightly, to reject exaggerated claims about the decline of the
national state as a coordinating actor. On the other, and despite the continued popu-
larity of the varieties of capitalism argument as a device for labelling national econo-
mies, Hall and Soskice’s (2001) vision of globalisation leading to a relatively benign
process of nations building upon their path-dependent institutionalised strengths is
likely to seem optimistic to most industrial relations scholars, given the extent to
which liberalising pressures have been felt even in the core ‘coordinated market econ-
omies’ such as Germany (Holst, 2014), and the broader difficulties faced in persuad-
ing firms to tolerate ‘constraints’, even if their effects may be beneficial at an
aggregate, national level (Marsden, 2015).
A more mitigated argument, implied by a number of theorists of the political econ-
omy of the state (Cerny 1997; Jessop 2004), is that contemporary economic globalisa-
tion has gone hand-in-hand with changes in thinking on the functions and forms of
states, in their role as economic coordinators. In particular, this refers to a move away
from Fordist/Keynesian-style coordination and regulation of the political economy
by nation states, towards one in which states effectively compete with each other to
provide supports to innovation and competitiveness (Jessop, 2004). This transition
has been marked by a decline in nation states’ capacity, and in some cases interest,
in controlling the lead firms within their territories: former national champions were
privatised and/or ‘deregulated’, and often partly or wholly bought out by
international capital; and state supports to firms became increasingly regulated at
supra-national levels. Thus, since at least the 1980s, states have, in general, placed less
emphasis on the defence of national productive capital—whether in the form of the
state-owned monopolistic firms of Fordist-era Western Europe, or private-sector na-
tional champions. Instead, more emphasis has been placed on attempts to capture
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relatively mobile investment, and more broadly at integrating domestic firms within
GPN (see below).
In summary, there has been a broad process of transition in highly developed econ-
omies from a ‘Keynesian welfare state’—the sort of ‘Fordist’ state particularly likely
to introduce social democratically inspired ‘constraints’ as part of national compro-
mises between capital and labour, towards the institutions of political economy being
reconceived as international competitive factors (Cerny; Jessop, 2004; 2013). This has
important implications for those who study industrial relations and labour market
regulation, which have sometimes been masked by a tendency to see ‘neo-liberal’ re-
forms to labour markets as simply being about deregulation (for previous arguments
in this vein, see MacKenzie and Martinez Lucio, 2005). Particularly, it is important
that the field of industrial relations is able to ask questions about what sorts of com-
petitiveness are favoured by state policy and by labour market governance actors,
with what legitimacy, and with what role for associational governance and industrial
relations actors.
3 THE ‘MICRO’ CONTEXT: FROM THE ‘FORDIST’ FIRM TO THE GLOBAL
PRODUCTION NETWORK
The discussion above reflects the still-continuing fallout from the long decline of
‘Fordist’ or ‘Keynesian’ methods of stabilising capitalism at national levels. Equally,
and relatedly, the context of the competition for productive investment has been
shaped, at micro-level, by the progressive decline, over a period of several decades,
of what is variously labelled the ‘Chandlerian’ or ‘Fordist’ firm. For our purposes
here, these constituted the large firms, often benefiting from monopoly rents at the
national level and sometimes with a history of state control and ownership, which co-
ordinated integrated production systems with internalised supply chains (Herrigel and
Zeitlin, 2010). These firms historically benefited from semi-closed national markets,
which provided the protection under which they tolerated—and indeed benefited
from—the social compromises of the post-war Fordist era (Boyer, 1986). Fordism,
both as a productive system and as a nationally delineated system of the regulation
of industrial capitalism, developed unevenly, and with different levels of overall co-
herence in terms of its relations with pre-existing national trajectories of social regu-
lation, across different countries of the global North (Zysman, 1996). This allowed
for the co-existence of a number of somewhat different national patterns of coordina-
tion of the political economy, as reflected in the comparative capitalisms literature
(Whitley, 1992).
Chandlerian/Fordist firms, particularly those from dominant states, frequently
sought to expand their productive activities beyond national borders. As critical
labour-focussed scholarship at the time argued, such firms did attempt to exploit na-
tional differences in industrial relations and wage levels (Malles, 1971): where market
access permitted, subsidiary units would be opened in lower labour-cost countries (cf.
Fernandez de Sevilla, 2010). However, typically the division of labour between plants
was relatively unsophisticated, often being primarily based on the need to avoid tar-
iffs and other barriers to trade, and to reduce transportation costs. Very often, foreign
subsidiary units essentially replicated production in the MNCs’ country of origin
(Doremus et al., 1998). This gave rise to a literature on the ‘branch plant’, the subsid-
iary unit with relative protection from wider global competition, but sometimes
poorly integrated into local production systems in host economies, offering relatively
118 Phil Almond et al.
© 2017 The Authors. Industrial Relations Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
few possibilities for economic development. Sonn and Lee (2012), in reviewing this
literature, usefully detail and evaluate some of the perceived issues of such plants:
limited employment effects in, or spillovers to, the wider economy, poor quality jobs,
a lack of R&D activity and exploitation of government incentives.
While such branch plants continue to exist where product market access requires
their existence, the current era has been marked by a pronounced fragmentation of
the value chains of lead firms. This fragmentation is both organisational and geo-
graphical (Herrigel and Zeitlin, 2010). Organisational fragmentation initially mainly
concerned the outsourcing of relatively peripheral parts of firms’ value chains, but has
advanced to the point where core parts of the production networks such as R&D may
be outside the hierarchical scope of leading firms (Spithoven and Teirlinck, 2015). At
the same time, firms are increasingly able to locate their production across a wider
range of geographies. Herrigel and Zeitlin usefully refer to the ‘fineslicing’ of the
activities of lead firms’ value networks. In other words, firms are increasingly able
to—and are under intense financial pressure to—make fine-grained decisions about
the most appropriate geographical and organisational locations for different elements
of their production processes.
These processes have given rise to extensive literatures on the coordination of
global value chains (Gereffi et al., 2005), and more recently the somewhat more the-
oretically sophisticated concept of GPN, as an increasingly important structural fea-
ture of the organisation of production, as Murray et al. (this issue) reflect. These
literatures are widely used in labour-focussed geographical research (Selwyn, 2012;
Cumbers et al., 2008; Rutherford and Holmes, 2007). They have also had some reflec-
tions in the field of industrial relations (Lakhani et al., 2013; Helfen and Fichter,
2013), although more typically in the literature on the global South than in
mainstream discussion of the coordination of firms in the global North.
The GPN literature gives analytical priority to how lead firms coordinate interna-
tional production through relations with a wide range of actors. These include depen-
dent firms, the state at various geographical levels, education, training and research
infrastructures, and a wide range of associational actors, including employers’ associ-
ations and trade unions. It therefore attempts to locate an analysis of the roles of such
actors within ‘fragmented’, yet still actively coordinated, international networks of
the production and exploitation of value. In particular, GPN analysis seeks to discuss
the ways in which the sub-national region—its preferred geographical unit of analysis
—can attempt to maintain and develop relations that will enable it to take and
preserve privileged positions in production networks.
Importantly, for GPN scholars, the strategies regional actors must take to develop
favourable positions in GPN go beyond the more established notions of ‘comparative
institutional advantage’ often found in the comparative capitalisms literature. In
other words, comparative institutionalists often posit relatively ‘static’ forms of com-
parative advantage, generally at the national level, such as the familiar argument that
German business and employment system institutions created a comparative advan-
tage in more sophisticated areas of the manufacturing sector through high-quality vo-
cational training and participative patterns of work (Sorge, 1991). GPN, meanwhile,
sees the relationship between regions and firms as a more dynamic relationship of
‘coupling’ (Coe et al., 2004). This core concept implies that there is, or needs to be,
a continual process of adaptation of regions’ human and other resources to the con-
stantly evolving needs of firms within GPN. These processes of adaptation are not
limited to occasional institutional reforms: rather, they refer to continual, mutually
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adaptive, relations between international firms and geographically embedded state
and other governance actors.
In arguing for an explicit consideration of how regional actors activate networks in
order to respond to the demands of international competition, the GPN literature
builds upon, and extends, earlier arguments within regional studies and economic ge-
ography that the global fragmentation of production was likely to cause the local net-
work embeddedness of the subsidiary operations of MNCs to increase (e.g. Morgan,
1997). Routine branch plants, serving national markets and operating to well-
established corporate production methods, could often function with limited
interactions with local business system actors. However, where lead firms develop
the capacity to make fine-grained decisions about the geographical and
organisational location of their activities, subsidiary units increasingly compete to
exercise functions, or ‘mandates’ on an international basis (Birkinshaw, 1996), which
may be global or at the level of the supranational ‘region’. Units which are unsuccess-
ful in these contests are increasingly marginalised, and threatened in cases where
access to markets no longer requires the existence of local/national ‘branches’.
In analysing what this means for ‘host’ institutional actors, on the one hand, as
more conventional industrial relations analysis has long recognised, the power of
MNCs to ‘shop’ between the regimes and resources of nations and regimes has greatly
increased. The fact that much productive investment is mobile makes it much more
difficult for regional governments, businesses, employees and trade unions to reach
long-term relationships with inward investors. However, this marked shift in the bal-
ance of power does not mean that the role of host institutions has been reduced to a
simple avoidance of ‘constraints’. Rather, host institutions have been repurposed to at
least some extent, as the attraction and retention of the investment and jobs associ-
ated with the high value-added components of GPN requires that regional and na-
tional actors seek, through the agency of their business system actors, to provide
embedded resources.
4 REGIONAL BUSINESS SYSTEM COORDINATION
The GPN literature argues that locations have become, with greater or lesser degrees
of willingness, subject to international competition to provide embedded resources
while at the same time minimising costs. Sub-national, regional governance actors,
as generally relatively low-power levels of the state, often bear the brunt of efforts
to develop and retain links to GPN, as it is at local and regional levels that specific
contests for investment have most social and economic impact.
At a minimum, regional competition is manifested through the existence of inward
investment bodies and economic development agencies. These explicitly attempt to
differentiate the ‘offer’ of their region to geographically mobile firms (Phelps and
Fuller, 2001). Such efforts may be confined to place marketing and (direct or indirect)
subsidies. However, as GPN analysis implies (Coe and Yeung, 2015), more
transversal attempts at building competitiveness also occur. Relevant regional
actors—including governmental actors, training institutions, research bodies, em-
ployers’ associations, development agencies and trade unions—may seek to gain the
capacity to engage in what is variously labelled ‘institutional entrepreneurship’
(Crouch, 2005) or ‘institutional experimentation’ (Kristensen and Morgan, 2012):
building on, or in some cases departing from, elements of their national business
systems in order to seek localised advantages.
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This means that for a particular subsidiary unit of an MNC, the ‘host’ business and
employment system may offer resources in a different manner, or to different extents,
than what an overall picture of the national organisation of capitalism might reveal.
It includes the localised agency of conventional business system actors, and of those
institutions which have the specific purpose of encouraging FDI. Indeed, assuming
that the national system is capable of achieving basic requirements (such as a suffi-
cient degree of macro-economic stability, access to national and international mar-
kets, and industrial peace), managers in subsidiary units of MNCs are often much
more concerned with what labour market and skills institutions actually deliver on
the ground within the labour market(s) in which they operate, that with what a
portrayal of a national system might reveal.
In practice, the relevant geographical scope of subsidiary units’ labour markets
varies quite radically depending on the occupational profiles required by the firm or
business unit; the labour market for post-doctoral research scientists in the field of life
sciences may well be genuinely international, for example. However, for the majority
of occupations, the relevant labour market is fairly local, meaning that MNC units
that require non-generic skills depend on the outputs of the skills ecosystems present
at local and regional levels. New inward investors have the luxury of choosing be-
tween the outputs of rival ecosystems, and can choose between regions as much as
they can between nations. The competition for replacement investment in existing
plants, meanwhile, is generally between specific existing subsidiary units, embedded
in specific local and regional labour market ecosystems, rather than only between
nations.
It is also important that the analysis of industrial and employment relations in
MNCs takes account of sub-national levels of governance in order fully to understand
the power that MNCs have on host business and employment systems. Both the ef-
fects of firms’ location decisions, and the broader impact of MNCs on employment
and organisational practices in host economies, are most keenly felt at local and re-
gional levels. Threats of large plant closures, in particular, may be bad news for na-
tional governments, but clearly have much more acute impact at the level of local
labour markets. Prior research in the field of economic geography has argued that this
leads to the establishment of a region state–MNC ‘nexus’ (Phelps and Fuller, 2001),
in which sub-national state actors, and often other local actors including trade unions,
become incorporated into the needs of local subsidiary units (Christopherson and
Clark, 2007). This leads to a risk of what might be termed ‘company town effects’, par-
ticularly where regional governance actors are faced with a small number of largeMNCs,
as tends to be the case in peripheral industrial regions (see Gonzalez et al., this issue).
Additionally, it has sometimes been argued that the shifts in the functions of eco-
nomic governance actors associated with a focus on international competitiveness
have been, or should be, accompanied by shifts in the levels of governance. The na-
tion state, in other words, becomes increasingly ‘leaky’ as a ‘container of governance’
(Brenner et al., 2003). Its coordinating capacities are fragmented, with some capacity
transferred upwards (e.g. supranational or transnational institutions providing com-
petition rules), and some downwards (with sub-national regions or localities charged
with developing flexible infrastructure, and tailoring to local economic and social
needs). Influential ideas on industrial policy, not least of which is the current EU
institutionalisation of ‘smart specialisation’ through Regional Innovation Strategies
(RIS3, see European Commission, 2014) clearly follow this script: regional govern-
ments are charged with identifying their potential competitive strengths, and how
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these might be operationalised, in association with producer and user stakeholders
(see also Gonzalez et al., this issue).
However, the balance between geographical levels of governance, and thus the re-
sources available to state and other governance actors at the regional level, remains
heavily contingent on national systems of political and economic governance. Unsur-
prisingly, the extent to which regional institutional actors have the capacity to de-
velop autonomous means of coordinating business systems tends to be greater in
federal political systems than in more unitary or centralised ones. In other words, in
examining the similarities and differences in regional responses to the competition
for investment, it is important to take account of the fact that there are clear national
differences in the extent to which these is a governance space below the national level
which has sufficient autonomy to shape a ‘regional business system’, or at least to sig-
nificantly modulate particular spheres of the national business system. Thus, among
the cases examined in the remainder of this issue, we would argue that in Spain, the
regional autonomous communities have the capacity to put into place somewhat dif-
ferent modes of economic governance within the overall national business system.
While the industrial relations system remains national, region states, in conjunction
with employers’ associations and trade unions, have non-trivial capacities to make
different choices about the extent to which their governance of economic
development follows a somewhat more ‘coordinated’ or more ‘liberal’ pattern,
depending on electoral coalitions and the localised strength of organised capital and
labour. Region states are responsible for economic development, and work in
conjunction with EU-level governance actors on the development of plans such as
the ‘smart specialisation’ strategies on which European regional funding is based
(Camagni and Cappello, 2013). The analysis of Gonzalez et al. shows that the degree
to which organised labour has a role in regional economic development differs consid-
erably between more social democratically-oriented and more liberally oriented
regions.
The federal state of Canada allows for even greater differences in sub-national
economic coordination at the provincial level. These have been particularly enthusi-
astically seized in the case of Quebec (Murray et al., this issue). The development of
a Francophone ‘national’ identity since the 1960s has been intrinsically linked to a
considerably less ‘liberal’ approach to economic development than is to be found
in the rest of Canada. This has, to various extents over time, incorporated union
and business elites in a wide range of mechanisms for social and industrial
concertation. In fact, while at least at the level of a labelling device, Canada can
be characterised as a ‘liberal market economy’, it is at best dubious whether Quebec
can (cf. Bélanger and Trudeau, 2009). This degree of pursuit of alternative ap-
proaches below the level of the sovereign nation poses significant questions for
cross-national comparative research in general, which we return to in the concluding
discussion.
Elsewhere, as is well known, US states can effectively choose between continuing to
apply New Deal derived industrial relations regulation, and pursuing anti-union
‘Right to Work’ legislation. While the anti-labour animus of governance actors in
the Southern United States is powerful enough to exist independently of the need to
compete for FDI, it is very clear that such legislation is frequently used as part of a
low-wage, high-subsidy FDI regime (Brady and Wallace, 2000; Young, 2015).
Equally, a different form of sub-national variety, of particular relevance to a discus-
sion of MNCs and GPN, arises in the form of ‘Special Economic Zones’ or Export
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Processing Zones in a large number of developing and transition economies (cf.
Hammer, 2010).
Regions of England (Almond et al., this issue) clearly lack the coordinating capac-
ities of Spanish autonomous communities or Canadian provinces. While there may be
latent possibilities in the remainder of the UK, particularly in Scotland, English
regions are, to borrow Brenner et al.’s (2003: 16) formulation, ‘regions in themselves’
but not ‘regions for themselves’. While the current UK national government has been
keen to re-cast regions as ‘powerhouses’ or ‘engines’ (HM Treasury, 2015), it is fairly
clear that talk of devolution to city-regions in England is not likely to be accompanied
by the development of autonomous regional level approaches to the governance of
business systems. Ireland (Lavelle et al., this issue) is a somewhat different case; in
a small and highly centralised state, regions lack significant coordinating capacities.
However, from the perspective of FDI attractiveness, Ireland scarcely needs to con-
struct regional state-MNC nexuses, given its small size, the national state’s unwaver-
ing commitment to a development strategy based mainly around the attraction of
American FDI, and the subordination of large elements of the coordination of the na-
tional business system to this.
The extent to which regional actors have the capacity to inflect national character-
istics of the coordination of business systems is thus heavily related to path dependen-
cies in national systems of government. It is also not necessarily stable: at moments of
crisis, regional efforts at coordination may be disrupted by the reassertion of national
or supranational interests of the state or of powerful fractions of capital, as, for exam-
ple, occurred in Spain when the regime of collective redundancies was centralised
(and liberalised) at the national level as a response to the 2008 crisis, removing the
right of regional governments to impose somewhat different requirements on firms
seeking to engage in collective dismissals. We are not, therefore, arguing that the
changing nature of international economic competition following the demise of
Fordism leads automatically to greater levels of autonomy of regional business sys-
tems. However, the geographical concentration of specific firms and specific types
of economic activity in particular places does mean that, at business unit level, man-
agers are likely to be primarily concerned with what resources the business and em-
ployment system creates within specific geographical labour markets. Equally, the
specific power that mobile firms have over governance actors is to an extent geo-
graphically concentrated in the places they operate. For both these reasons, it is im-
portant that the industrial relations analysis of the construction of ‘host’ economy
effects takes full account of institutional agency at regional levels, whether or not this
is accompanied by strongly autonomous regional governance actors.
4.1 Forms of regional governance of FDI
The above arguments imply that sub-national levels of analysis are important in
attempting to understand how the international competition to host mobile produc-
tion shapes business and employment systems. Here, we attempt to build on this by
reflecting on what regions may do in order to try to capture mobile investment,
whether through their direct efforts to attract FDI (e.g. through inward investment
agencies, etc.), or through attempts to shape their business and employment systems
in ways that build competitiveness in GPN.
Comparative research in industrial relations rests quite heavily on typologies which
seek to categorise national differences in political economy into a small number of
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ideal types. The most prominent schema is the varieties of capitalism framework (Hall
and Soskice, 2001). In order to situate our conceptualisation of the governance of
FDI, it is perhaps useful to briefly explain some of the problems with this (see also
Almond and Gonzalez, 2014).
While it is clearly convenient to be able to present the broad characteristics of
national political economies using the shorthand of liberal, coordinated or mixed
market economies, it is a very blunt tool to use in discussions of governance. For
example, as Piore (2016) points out, the postwar construction of the archetypal
‘liberal market economy’ of the USA was ‘not…directed by the market at all, but
by large corporate organisation, trade unions, and government agencies working di-
rectly with one another…it operated at the micro level in a way that was consistent
with the Keynesian macroeconomy’.
In reality, the social construction of business and employment regimes involves
some combination of market, associational and state-led governance. While the
relative weight of these may differ, the construction of more or less coherent regimes
requires elements of all three (see Crouch’s (2005) arguments on how ‘complementar-
ities’ require the supplementing the predominant mode of economic coordination
with other forms). Equally, it is important to recognise that all attempts to ‘fix’ the
regulation of capitalism are crisis-prone (Boyer, 1986; Jessop, 2013), and the result
of conflict, whether implicit or explicit. For this reason, while imagining ideal types
is a useful process in theory-building, one should be very cautious before ascribing ac-
tually-existing cases to these. In a literal sense, all national and regional variants of
capitalism are in fact ‘mixed market economies’. Thus, here we present categories
of action (market, state or associational-centred), with regard to sub-national state ac-
tions taken to attract FDI, to retain and attempt to embed MNCs already present
within regions, and more broadly actions taken specifically to develop international
competitiveness. We are not, however, arguing that empirical cases will follow any
one of these categories of action in an exclusive or pure manner.
Market-centred governance of FDI would, in principle, imply a rather passive de-
pendence on the competitive advantages of a location. Here, the (region) state would
effectively abstain from questions of actively coordinating industrial policy, in the be-
lief that such coordination is unhelpful, unnecessary or beyond its capacity. The
‘state–MNC nexus’, in this case, would be limited to attempting to regulate in ways
that permitted firms to choose their own routes to competition as efficiently as possi-
ble. Regional development institutions would be limited to some kind of inward in-
vestment marketing office, shorn of any links to wider economic development. This
route would exclude a meso-level role in economic development for trade unions,
and would also be exclusionary of organised capital and other civil society actors
and institutions.
It is possible, in principle, to combine a passive, non-interventionist approach to in-
ward investment attraction with an institutionally dense regional or national business
system. However, because regions that favour market-centred governance of FDI
tend to be governed by those that espouse a market-centred approach to political
economy in general, this approach often consists of marketing the advantages associ-
ated with overtly neo-liberal approaches, such as low taxation, low labour costs, or
employer-favourable labour regulation. It is also associated with the rhetoric of ‘not
picking winners’ (see Almond et al., this issue).
Regions can and do compete on the basis of being the ‘most free market region’
within their national economy. This may consist of relatively poor regions competing
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in a race to the bottom on wages and labour regulation, where national legislation
permits this, or of metropolitan regions trying to compete on the basis of reducing in-
stitutional complexity and challenging what they perceive as barriers to the operation
of the free market. The Madrid region, for example, has attempted to compete on the
latter basis within the context of a relatively densely institutionalised national econ-
omy (Gonzalez et al., this issue), while the Thatcher-era UK competed on this basis
at a European level. However, there are at least three important qualifications to this.
First, at a conceptual level it is important to recognise that anything approaching a
‘free market’ approach can only be created by active state regulation and interpreta-
tion of what a ‘market’ approach actually implies within a pre-existing social context.
Second, and more concretely, few governments, regional or national, are genuinely
market-centred enough to resist the temptation to provide direct or indirect subsidies
to firms. ‘Employer-friendly’ or low tax approaches are generally accompanied with
incentives to firms, which are in some cases very extensive (for the USA see Brady,
2015), and represent very clear ‘distortions’ from any conceptualisation of a free mar-
ket. Finally, even in political contexts where the ‘liberal’ right is dominant, there are
social limits to non-interventionist policies. In particular, the closure of local plants is
clearly bad news with potentially dangerous political consequences. This tends to
mean that national or regional states governments which espouse free-market ap-
proaches tend to come under pressure to engage, however reluctantly, in more active
policies where there are genuine threats to local investment.
State-coordinated governance implies significant interventions into the regional
business system, specifically targeted at increasing the international competitiveness
of the private sector. This is accompanied by active attempts by the state (usually
but not necessarily at regional level), to engage with existing foreign direct investors
in order to build relationships aimed at developing some sort of coherence between
the needs of specific MNCs and the development needs of the region. This is done
both to attempt to secure further investment from these firms, and to attempt to en-
courage MNCs to develop linkages within the region—with local firms, with the re-
search and education sectors, etc.—in order to ‘couple’ the regional economy with
higher value-added portions of GPN (Coe and Yeung, 2015). Such attempts may in-
volve direct intervention by agencies of the region state. It may also entail the political
leadership of associational governance—that is, attempts to bring business system ac-
tors together in the interests of the regional economy’s international competitiveness.
One possibility frequently used in attempts to ‘upgrade’ regional economies is for
the state to put in place fairly encompassing regional development agencies. These ef-
fectively seek to ensure the supply of whatever economic coordination is perceived as
necessary. This may consist of the direct provision of services to correct for ‘market
failures’, particularly in more liberally-oriented economies (Huggins, 2001; Pike and
Tomaney, 2009). The English Regional Development Agencies under New Labour
were a clear example of this. Here, a centrist government in a liberal economy created
state-led regional agencies in response to a perceived need for active coordination in
order to secure international competitiveness at regional levels, closely following con-
temporary scripts on ‘knowledge-driven’ competitiveness within a globalising econ-
omy. The English RDAs were responsible for the coordination (and funding) of
other institutional actors to build internationally competitive skills and innovation
systems. For MNC unit managers, such agencies also played an important role in
reducing institutional complexity, acting as the face of the state at regional levels.
In particular, through their direct interactions with international firms, Regional
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Development Agencies sought to perform an interest aggregation role, bringing the
skills needs of diverse firms together in order that mechanisms could be sought to
fulfil an aggregate demand. Such a role is much less necessary in regions and coun-
tries where industrial relations actors are more capable of articulating such needs,
and where managers and collective labour actors at firm or unit level have a greater
degree of social conditioning that points them towards collective action in these
areas.
As the abandonment of RDAs in England shows, such agencies are crisis-prone,
and face serious problems of legitimacy, particularly in more overtly neo-liberal pol-
ities where state institutions in the productive sphere come under question. Such prob-
lems may be somewhat mitigated if representative collective actors are involved in the
governance of such institutions. Equally, where such institutions exist, it is important
that representative industrial relations actors have the capacity to be seen as central
actors with which the development agencies have close coordinating relations. For de-
velopment agencies to contribute to regional business and employment system con-
struction in a sustainable way, their role would need to be interpreted as attempting
to build up the capacity of associational governance actors, rather than simply
substituting for them.
Associational governance in the domain of FDI concerns the willingness and ability
of local business system actors—including local firms, social partners, and actors in
the education and research sectors, etc.—to engage with locally established MNCs
in ways that leverage location-specific advantages. It might also include networking
between managers of different MNCs within the region. It thus includes both formal
and informal associationalism.
The formal side of this involves meso-corporatist arrangements of various kinds.
Examples include sectoral workforce committees in Quebec, which, at least in indus-
tries where trade unions are relatively powerful, can be seen not only as attempts to
create a better coordinated skills system, but also as an important institution in bring-
ing together senior managers of firms and trade unionists outside the arena of collec-
tive bargaining. In the highly collectivist regional environment of Asturias in Spain,
neo-corporatist arrangements are represented by a peak-level collective agreement.
This goes well beyond ‘industrial relations’ questions such as skills and training, as
it effectively underwrites the social and economic development policy of the regional
government, including the operations of a regional development agency which itself
has tripartite governance.
As with broader national level neo-corporatism, such institutions may respond to
the needs of regional governments to seek legitimacy, as well as attempting to
discipline industrial relations actors in the needs of regions subjected to international
competition within GPN. Regions may also seek to build formal associationalist
governance—beyond the ‘average level’ of their national states—as a form of
expression of belief in social democracy, as a response to the concentration of productive
investment in heavy industry, and/or as an expression of a territorial social
identity.
Less formal types of associationalist governance include attempts by region-states
or development agencies to encourage productive relations between firms in related
sectors through cluster or ‘smart specialisation’ strategies, which aim to ensure that
firms and other regional actors participate in collective thinking about the develop-
mental needs involved in their areas of economic activity. Such initiatives may either
be an attempt at building dialogue, in cases where this is lacking, or at channelling
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existing associations and local/regional networks towards efforts at building
international competitiveness.
Finally, if the attraction and retention of FDI involves the provision of financial aid
to firms, then it is possible for grants regimes to seek to bolster associational gover-
nance of one form or another. That is, aid can be accompanied by requirements to
embed firms within the region. Typical examples include cooperation with local edu-
cation and research institutions, and attempts to develop relations with the regional
SME sector within production networks. The case of Quebec represents a particularly
articulated version of a subsidy regime oriented towards embedding firms and
developing regional economies.
In summary, the balance between market, state and associational governance dif-
fers between regions and nations. The specific governance of the FDI-state nexus
may follow broader patterns of coordination of the wider national or regional polit-
ical economy, or may attempt to complement them (Crouch, 2005), by compensating
for their perceived weaknesses. The processes of exclusion of collective actors in mar-
ket-centred governance, the shaping of labour markets involved in state-coordinated
governance, the potential role of trade unions and other industrial relations actors in
the associational governance of FDI, and the tensions between these forms of
governance, all merit further attention within the field of industrial relations.
5 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
There has been much discussion of how employment relations in MNCs is structured
both by the selective transfer of practices drawing upon country-of-origin repertoires
(Ferner, 1997), and by the resistance or hybridisation that takes place when
HQ-derived policies are transferred to operations in foreign host economies (Collings,
2009). However, while the analysis of firm-level transfer, and its role in shaping social
space within domestic employment systems, remains necessary, the arguments above
imply that it is not sufficient to an understanding of the interplay between interna-
tional firms and domestic employment systems. Work on industrial and employment
relations within MNCs (and internationally exposed firms in general) needs to
integrate a more adequate treatment of the context in which contests for investment
take place, and of the role of actors both within and outside the firm in this.
Within the MNC, the processes of fineslicing indicated above mean that subsidiary
managers, often alongside worker representatives and others with an interest in
defending jobs within communities, must increasingly compete for supra-national
mandates. Arriving at competitive positions in these ‘global games’ (Kristensen and
Zeitlin, 2004) often requires various coalitions between the MNC subsidiary unit
and locally embedded actors, which may involve collective labour, alongside other
actors in vocational education and training, the regional innovation system, and, as
we have indicated, the local and regional state (Kristensen and Morgan, 2012;
Geppert and Dorrenbacher, 2014).
MNC subsidiary-unit actors differ in their capacity to do this. Different manage-
ment structures, and different host business system configurations, may lead subsidi-
ary managers either to tend to perceive their interests as being in simply following the
orders of headquarters, or to perceive that they should attempt to use links with local
actors outside the firm to boost their competitive position in a more entrepreneurial
way. Morgan and Kristensen (2006) argue that the former, more reactive, outcome
is the more likely possibility in centralised MNCs, and/or in cases where the local
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business system’s resources are essentially limited to the absence of constraints—that
is, where the basis of competitiveness is light regulation, low costs, flexibility, etc. The
more proactive subsidiary unit management approach is more likely to emerge in
more ‘federal’ firms, and where the local business ecosystem possesses unique or
scarce resources which can be drawn upon by those with specific local expertise. Mor-
gan and Kristensen use this as the basis for their distinction between ‘boy scouts’ and
‘subversive strategists’, with the strong implication that the latter are more likely to
favour positive forms of regional development. Relatedly, the work of Bélanger
et al. (2013), explores, using survey data, the relations between the embeddedness in
parent MNC networks, on the one hand, and local economy networks, on the other,
of foreign MNCs’ subsidiaries in Canada, and finds that local network embeddedness
is associated with greater degrees of subsidiary unit autonomy from central MNC
control.
An analysis of how subsidiary unit managers, but also trade unions in their joint
role as unit-level, sectoral and regional actors, interpret the specific nature of intra-
corporate competition within their subsidiary units, and attempt to activate the po-
tential advantages of local and regional networks, is an important avenue for future
research. More generally, understanding location and labour market structures on a
case-by-case basis represents a significant research agenda which can better link stud-
ies of industrial relations and human resource management in multinationals with an
analysis of the territorial social dynamics of globalising production. This involves go-
ing beyond a standard institutionalist analysis based on how industrial relations and
human resource practices relate to the norms of host and host country systems, and
integrating an analysis of the purposes of firms’ investments in specific places, the
scale of the labour markets it is drawing from, to what extent subsidiary unit compet-
itiveness relies on interactions with local business and employment system actors, and
what skills are necessary in order to access such resource networks.
The attempts of communities and societies to capture the high-value added parts of
GPN should not be seen as necessitating ‘deregulation’; rather, in order to cohere
with such networks, the formal regulation of business and employment systems is in-
creasingly supplemented or inflected by actions taken by the state and other gover-
nance actors, often at relatively local levels, to attract and embed internationally
mobile capital, and more broadly to develop ‘competitiveness’. As we have indicated
above, and as the other articles in this issue explore in more detail, this may be done
through a range of specific mechanisms, which may be more or less socially inclusive,
and with more or less role for traditional industrial relations actors.
In some places, sub-national regions have significant political and social capacity to
attempt to govern these relations, making the regional analysis of business and em-
ployment systems crucial to an understanding of broader institutional dynamics. This
is clearly the case in federal states, and may increasingly be the case in other places
that seek regional autonomy or indeed national independence. In some of these cases,
it is worth asking the question as to whether ‘sub-nations’ merit more serious consid-
eration as business systems. In other words, if comparative research consists, follow-
ing the argument of one standard manual, of the ‘attempt to study particular issues or
phenomena in two or more countries with the express intention of comparing their
manifestations in different socio-cultural settings, using the same research instru-
ments’ (Hantrais and Mangen 1996: 1), then sub-national territories with significantly
different socio-political and/or national identities to those of their national states may
acquire the status of having ‘different socio-cultural settings’ to at least some extent.
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More generally, though, processes of articulation between territories and GPN take
place, in one form or another, whether or not sub-national regions represent an im-
portant level of political governance. They involve a wide range of actors—institu-
tional industrial relations actors, institutions governing skills development, all
geographical levels of government, education and research institutions, sectoral asso-
ciations and development agencies, to name but a few. These are organised differently
in different places, with logics that may differ according both to the degree of institu-
tional density of the political economy, and to the national pattern of relations be-
tween local, regional, national and supranational levels of political governance.
Understanding these, in order that industrial relations research can inform actors’
responses, requires in-depth analysis of how places’ articulation with these networks
is formulated.
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